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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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DESIGNATED/ELECTED OFFICE (DO/EO/US)  
CONCERNING A FILING UNDER 35 U.S.C. 371

16674-8

U.S. APPLICATION NO. (if known, see 37 CFR 1.5)

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INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION NO.  
PCT/IB00/00847INTERNATIONAL FILING DATE  
23 June 2000PRIORITY DATE CLAIMED  
4 August 1999TITLE OF INVENTION METHOD AND DEVICE FOR GUARANTEEING THE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF  
A SET OF DATA

APPLICANT(S) FOR DO/EO/US Michael John HILL; Christophe NICOLAS; Marco SASSELLI

Applicant herewith submits to the United States Designated/Elected Office (DO/EO/US) the following items and other information:

1. ☒ This is a **FIRST** submission of items concerning a filing under 35 U.S.C. 371.
2. ☐ This is a **SECOND** or **SUBSEQUENT** submission of items concerning a filing under 35 U.S.C. 371.
3. ☒ This is an express request to begin national examination procedures (35 U.S.C. 371(f)). The submission must include items (5), (6), (9) and (21) indicated below.
4. ☒ The US has been elected by the expiration of 19 months from the priority date (Article 31).
5. ☒ A copy of the International Application as filed (35 U.S.C. 371(c)(2))
  - a. ☒ is attached hereto (required only if not communicated by the International Bureau).
  - b. ☐ has been communicated by the International Bureau.
  - c. ☐ is not required, as the application was filed in the United States Receiving Office (RO/US).
6. ☒ An English language translation of the International Application as filed (35 U.S.C. 371(c)(2)).
  - a. ☒ is attached hereto.
  - b. ☐ has been previously submitted under 35 U.S.C. 154(d)(4).
7. ☒ Amendments to the claims of the International Application under PCT Article 19 (35 U.S.C. 371(c)(3))
  - a. ☐ are attached hereto (required only if not communicated by the International Bureau).
  - \* b. ☐ have been communicated by the International Bureau.
  - c. ☐ have not been made; however, the time limit for making such amendments has NOT expired.
  - d. ☒ have not been made and will not be made.
8. ☐ An English language translation of the amendments to the claims under PCT Article 19 (35 U.S.C. 371(c)(3)).
9. ☒ An oath or declaration of the inventor(s) (35 U.S.C. 371(c)(4)).
10. ☒ An English language translation of the annexes of the International Preliminary Examination Report under PCT Article 36 (35 U.S.C. 371(c)(5)). Attached to the English language translation of the International Application

## Items 11 to 20 below concern document(s) or information included:

11. ☒ An Information Disclosure Statement under 37 CFR 1.97 and 1.98.
12. ☐ An assignment document for recording. A separate cover sheet in compliance with 37 CFR 3.28 and 3.31 is included.
13. ☒ A FIRST preliminary amendment.
14. ☐ A SECOND or SUBSEQUENT preliminary amendment.
15. ☐ A substitute specification.
16. ☐ A change of power of attorney and/or address letter.
17. ☐ A computer-readable form of the sequence listing in accordance with PCT Rule 13ter.2 and 35 U.S.C. 1.821 - 1.825.
18. ☒ A second copy of the published international application under 35 U.S.C. 154(d)(4).
19. ☒ A second copy of the English language translation of the international application under 35 U.S.C. 154(d)(4).
20. ☒ Other items or information: International Search Report  
International Preliminary Examination Report

INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION NO  
PCT/IB00/00847

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FORM PTO-1390 (REV 9-2001) page 2 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

In re patent ) BOX PCT  
application of: )  
)  
Michael John Hill et al. )  
)  
Corresponding to International Application )  
No. PCT/IB00/00847 )  
)  
Filed June 23, 2000 )  
)  
METHOD AND DEVICE FOR )  
GUARANTEEING THE INTEGRITY )  
AND AUTHENTICITY OF A SET OF )  
DATA ) January 16, 2002

PRELIMINARY AMENDMENT


Box PCT  
Commissioner for Patents  
Washington, DC 20231

Sir:

As a Preliminary Amendment to the above-referenced Application, please enter the following amendments prior to computing the filing fees therefore.

**IN THE CLAIMS :**

**Please cancel claims 1-26 and add new claims 27-52 in lieu thereof as follows:**

Express Mail Label No. <u>EL916999394US</u>	Date of Deposit: <u>January 16, 2002</u>
I hereby certify that this paper or fee is being deposited with the United States Postal Service "Express Mail Post Office to Addressee" service under 37 CFR §1.10 on the date indicated above and is addressed to the Commissioner for Patents, Washington, DC 20231.	
 _____ Signature of person mailing paper or fee	

27. A method to check the integrity and the authenticity of a set of data (M1 to Mn) received by a pay-T.V. decoding unit, consisting of a decoder (IRD) and a security unit (SC), and also by a means of communication (NET, REC) with a control center, including the following steps;

- calculation of a check information ( $H_x$ ) which is representative of the result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data (M1 to Mn);

characterized in that, this method consisting of :

- transmitting the check information ( $H_x$ ) to the security unit (SC) and ciphering the check information ( $H_x$ ) with a first cipher-key ( $k_1$ );
- sending the ciphered control information  $k_1(H_x)$  to the control center;
- deciphering of the ciphered check information  $k_1(H_x)$  by the control center and comparing it with a reference value of the check information ( $H_y$ );
- transmitting the control data (R) including the result of the comparison in a ciphered form to the security unit (SC);
- deciphering of the ciphered result of the comparison by the security unit (SC) and informing the decoder (IRD) of the validity of the data (M1 to Mn).

28. A method according to claim 27, characterized by the fact that the control center sends the reference value in a ciphered form  $k_2(H_y)$  with the control data (R) to the security module (SC).

29. A method according to claim 27 or 28, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the decoder (IRD), with the result being transmitted to the security unit (SC).

30. A method according to claim 27 or 28, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the security unit (SC), and the data (M1 to Mn) is transmitted from the decoder (IRD) to the security unit (SC).

31. A method according to claims 27 or 28, characterized by the fact that it consists of including a utilization describer (D) for the data (M1 to Mn) in the control data (R), deciphering the control data (R) and transmitting the describer (D) to the decoder (IRD) if the result of the comparison is positive, processing the data (M1 to Mn) by the decoder (IRD) according to the guidelines contained in the describer (D).

32. A method according to claims 27 or 28, characterized by the fact that the data (M1 to Mn) are accompanied by validity information (CRC, CS, H) for the said data, and in which the security module (SC) transmits to the decoder the information to use or not this validity information to check the data (M1 to Mn).

33. A method according to claim 32, characterized by the fact that this validity information is of the type CRC (cyclic redundancy code), CS (checksum) or Hash (a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function).

34. A method according to claims 27 or 28, characterized by the fact that it includes a global check information (H'y) in the control data (R) which is representative of a result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the global data (M0 to Mm); this data is the same as, or includes, the data received (M1 to Mn).

35. A method according to claim 34, characterized by the fact that the control data (R) includes a warranty that certifies the broadcaster of the data (M1 to Mn).

36. A method according to claim 34, characterized by the fact that it consists of calculating periodically, or when requested, the value (H'x) representative of the result of a so-

called mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the global data (M0 to Mm), with the security unit (SC) comparing the result (H'x) with the reference value (H'y).

37. A method according to claim 36, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the decoder (IRD), with the result of the calculation (H'x) being transmitted to the security unit (SC).

38. A method according to claim 36, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the security unit (SC), with the data (M0 to Mm) being transmitted from the decoder (IRD) to the security unit (SC).

39. A method according to claim 36, characterized by the fact that the periodic calculation is carried out on request from the control center, from the security unit, from a test unit (TEST) or from one of the means of communication (NET, REC).

40. A method according to claim 36, characterized by the fact that the result of the comparison is transmitted in a subscriber generated message common to the functioning of the system.

41. A method according to claim 36 or 40, characterized by the fact that the value calculated (H'x) is transmitted to the control center inside subscriber generated messages common to the functioning of the system, with each message containing a part of the value calculated (H'x).

42. A method according to claims 39 or 40, characterized by the fact that the transmission to the control center is carried out in deferred mode, according to a timetable defined in a pseudo-random manner within predefined limits.

43. A method to check the integrity and the authenticity of a set of data (M1 to Mn) memorized inside a data storage unit connected with a security unit (SC) including the following steps:

- transmission from the storage unit to the security unit (SC) of the control data (R1) including ciphered reference check information k1(Hy) representative of the result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data (M1 to Mn);
- calculation of check information (Hx) which is representative of the result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data (M1 to Mn);
- comparison of the calculated value (Hx) with the deciphered reference value (Hy) by the security unit (SC) and transfer of the management data (R2) including the result of the comparison to the storage unit.

44. A method according to claim 43, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the storage unit, with the result of the calculation (Hx) being transmitted to the security unit (SC).

45. A method according to claim 43, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the security unit (SC), with the data (M1 to Mn) being transmitted from the storage unit to the security unit (SC).

46. A method according to claims 44 or 45, characterized by the fact that the control data (R1) includes a utilization describer (D) for the data (M1 to Mn), and if the result of the comparison is positive, sends the utilization describer (D) back to the storage unit in a

deciphered form, to process the data (M1 to Mn) by the storage unit according to the guidelines contained in the describer (D).

47. A method according to claim 43, characterized by the fact that the control data (R1) includes a certificate that certifies the broadcaster of the data (M1 to Mn).

48. A method according to claim 43, characterized by the fact that it consists of calculating periodically, or when requested, the values (Hx) representative of the result of a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data (M1 to Mm), with the security unit (SC) comparing the result (Hx) with the reference value (Hy).

49. A method according to claim 43, characterized by the fact that it consists of:

- storing the data (M1 to Mn) in a ciphered form;
- transmitting to the security unit (SC) in the control data (R1) of a deciphering key (k3) for the data (M1 to Mn).
- if the result of the comparison  $Hx=Hy$  is positive, deciphering of the data (M1 to Mn) with the use of the cipher-key (k3).

50. A method according to claim 49, characterized by the fact that the deciphering operation of the data (M1 to Mn) is carried out by the storage unit, the deciphering key (k3) being transmitted by the security unit (SC).


51. A method according to claim 49 characterized by the fact that the deciphering operation of the data (M1 to Mn) is carried out by the security unit (SC), the data (M1 to Mn) being transmitted from the storage unit to the security unit (SC).

52. A method according to claim 49 characterized by the fact that it includes, inside the control data (R1), a utilization describer (D) for the data (M1 to Mn), to decipher the



control data (R1) and transmit the describer (D) to the storage unit if the result of the comparison is positive, to process the data (M1 to Mn) by the storage unit according to the guidelines contained in the describer (D).

Respectfully submitted,

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#154966

A METHOD AND DEVICE TO GUARANTEE THE INTEGRITYAND AUTHENTICITY OF A SET OF DATA

This invention concerns the sector operating in the control of the integrity and authenticity of data, and in particular the downloading of software.

- 5 The invention is applied to all those apparatuses that contain at least one central unit such as those currently used in information technology, that is to say, with a processor that has at least a part of its program inside a rewrite memory.

It is well known that the alteration or the damage of data leaves traces in certain parts of the information processed and stored in a memory, either before or after  
10 being processed. It is also known that a simple mathematical technique such as "checksum" is used in order to determine if the data taken into consideration has been modified by establishing a checksum reference.

However, it is possible that the control system has also been altered and that it is no longer able to verify the contents of its memory. Thus, during the course of  
15 mathematical operations, the propagation of compensatory random errors may occur, giving an identical result to the one expected. Consequently, verification by the known methods will be inoperative in certain cases.

There is, therefore, a problem that is not solved in a satisfactory manner, which consists in improving the reliability and the security achieved by the known  
20 verification methods, particularly when the same unit is in charge of calculating its own checksum and of comparing it with a reference value.

It is well known that, in order to render all data modifications visible, a mono-directional operation is used on the data, that is, an operation that is easy to perform in one direction but almost impossible to perform in the other direction. For  
25 example, the operation  $X^Y$  is easy to carry out, while the operation  $Y\sqrt{X}$  is much more difficult.

The term collision-free operation means an operation according to which any different combination of data that is entered gives a similar result.

Within the sphere of this invention, this mono-directional operation is a  
30 mathematical application  $H$  of a source group towards an object group, in which each  $x$  element of the source group is attributed with an  $H_{(x)}$  symbol. These

functions are particularly useful when there are functions known as Hash, as they are defined on page 27 of the RSA Laboratories publication "Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography, v.4.0". The  $x$  element can be of any length, but  $H(x)$  always has a series of characters of a fixed length (fixed-size string). Such a function is difficult to invert, that is to say, knowing  $H(x)$  does not generally mean that  $x$  can be found. It is said to be more collision-free when it is injective, that is, that  $H(y) = H(x)$  leads to  $y = x$ , or  $H(y) \neq H(x)$  leads to  $y \neq x$ .

The aim of this invention is to guarantee that the information contained in a pay-T.V. decoder is, on the one hand, that which the control center has transmitted and, on the other hand, has not been altered.

The aim is achieved through the use of a method to check the integrity and authenticity of a set of memorized data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ) in a pay-T.V. decoding unit, consisting of a decoding unit and a security unit, along with a means of communication (NET, REC) with a control center.

This method consists in:

- transmitting the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ) to the security unit;
- calculating a check information ( $Hx$ ) representative of the result of a function called mono-directional and collision-free, carried out on all or only a part of the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ );
- ciphering the check information ( $Hx$ ) with a first cipher-key ( $k1$ );
- establishing the conformity of the check information ( $Hx$ ) by way of a communication to the control center by one of the means of communication.

In this way, the integrity of the data is no longer checked exclusively by the decoding unit in which the data is stored, but is guaranteed by an external unit, considered impenetrable, the security unit.

According to this invention, the decoder itself can carry out the calculations and transmit the results to the security unit, or transmit the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$  to the security unit which will then carry out the calculation of the Hash information.

The cipher-keys used to cipher the information with the control center are contained exclusively in the security unit. The decoder does not have the means to decipher

these messages and so modify the data transmitted by the control center when the same messages pass through the decoder.

These security units are generally in the form of smart-cards, and include a memory, a microprocessor and a means of communication.

- 5 By means of communication we mean either a two-directional connection by a cable, a modem outlet or a Hertzian-wave connection. The principle means of carrying the data and on which messages directed to the security module are forwarded is included in this term.

10 The verification operation of the conformity of the check information (Hx) may be carried out in various ways.

The security module sends the ciphered check information to the control center, the latter being in charge of carrying out the verification. In the reply, the control center may send either a simple result of the comparison OK/NOK, or send the reference value. All these messages are ciphered by a cipher-key of the security module.

- 15 The control center memorizes the result with reference to each subscriber unit as proof of the correct functioning of the downloading operation or, contrarily, of the alteration of the data in view of a repetition, for example.

20 According to a variation of the invention, the control center may first send the reference value directly to the security units. In this way, it will not be necessary to ask the control center to verify the conformity of the calculated check information, Hx.

25 With another operational method, and when a verification request comes from a security unit, the control center sends, as a comparison result, the reference value (Hy) in a ciphered form  $k_2(Hy)$  to the security unit. Once this is done, the control center does not only inform the security unit whether it is correct or not, but sends the reference value to the security unit. It will be done mainly if the comparison has given a positive result so that the security unit can memorize the reference value Hy.

30 The sending of this information can be carried out by an auxiliary means of communication such as a modem, or by the main data path.

In the case where the data M1 to Mn is already accompanied by a means of verification, such as CRC, Checksum or Hash, the decoding unit may carry out an initial test with the means contained inside it. None the less, the reliability of this test is to create a doubt, that is, if the data has been modified by a third person, it is certain that that person will have modified the verification means in the same way. This is because, with this method of the invention, the security unit can inform the decoding unit not to accept the test result as a guarantee of the authenticity of the data, but that the authenticity is determined according to the method described further on.

This variation is important in the case of the updating of a number of decoders, some of which of an old generation operating system type and in need of a Checksum verification, or others that have already been equipped for the system according to the method claimed herein.

When updated software is downloaded, it is quite common to send only the part that has been modified. The data M1 to Mn does not represent the whole newly-updated program. This is because, in order to maintain a reliable means of verifying the whole program, it is important to have an H'y reference value available that is representative of a Hash function in the newly created program.

There is a first method which consists in establishing the initial integrity of a program P0, that is, before being updated. To do this, the initial results H0 of the Hash function in the program P0 are either initialized on installing the program or established according to the method in this invention.

When the authenticity of the data of the update has been established and have been introduced into the memory program, the security unit can immediately order a Hash function to be carried out on the whole of the new program P1 giving the result H1. This result will be needed for the following checks or for further updates.

A variation of this method consists in obtaining the new H'y value which is representative of the result of the Hash function on the whole new program P1 from the control center, represented here by M0 to Mm.

The control data R sent by the control center may include a utilization data describer D that indicates to the decoding unit (IRD) how to use this data. The describer may be in the form of a table that contains all the addresses and

destinations of the data. In this way, it will not be possible to use this data without the describer, the latter being sent back to the decoding unit (IRD) only if the comparison is positive.

According to a variation of the invention, the control center includes a warranty to certify the broadcaster of the data with the control data R.

This verification function is connected not only to the downloading of new data in a decoder, but also allows the testing of the validity and authenticity of the data at any moment. In this case, the operation consists of periodically calculating, or according to a request, the representative Hx values of the result of a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function carried out on all or only a part of the data (M0 to Mm) in the operational memory of the decoder, and to transmit this information (H'x) to the security unit for comparison with a reference value (H'y).

To carry out this operation, there is a first method which consists in the calculation being carried out by the decoder, the result being transmitted to the security unit.

According to a variation of this method, the calculation is carried out by the security unit, with the data (M0 to Mm) being transmitted from the decoder to the security unit (SC).

The request for these verification operations may come from the control center, from the security unit, from a test unit or from one of the means of communication, even if they are under tension.

While the security unit compares the calculated H'x value with the reference value H'y, the latter may be represented either by the value calculated by the IRD decoder after the confirmation of its validity from the control center, or by the reference value supplied by the control center.

One of the ways in which certain dishonest people use to try and understand how a pay-T.V. system works, is to observe the reaction following an attempt at modifying it. This is why the invention is equally open to a way of transmitting the result of the comparison carried out with another method, for example when the subscriber decides to accept an event, and a subscriber generated message is sent to the control center.

It is useful to include the information that the data M1 to Mn has been changed in the message, otherwise it would be extremely difficult to make the tie between the

modification of the data and the blockage of the decoder, that could happen much later.

According to a variation, the value of the result of the calculation Hx is transmitted to the control center. To do this, and to remain hidden, the result is divided up and included piece by piece inside administration messages used by the system.

The control center recomposes the Hx value piece by piece and when the value is complete, determines if there are modifications to the values.

One problem that is encountered when updating a large number of decoders is with the number of requests to the control center to obtain the verification.

One proposed solution in the sphere of this invention is to sub-divide the requests to the control center for a verification in a pseudo-random way.

Another solution previously described consists in sending a preliminary reference value. In this way, if the data is received correctly, which is in the majority of cases, the update can take effect without waiting for a request at the control center. This request will be carried out anyway to confirm that the update has been carried out correctly.

In a particular way of operating, the group considered includes a transmitter part, located inside a control center, and a receiver that can be made up of quite a large number of peripheral units which work in a similar way. The aim is to guarantee that the software sent by the transmission part is received in an authentic and complete way by each of the peripheral units. In line with the terminology used in pay television, which represents an important but not exclusive application of the invention, the peripheral units will be called IRD (Integrated Receiver Decoder) in the following part of the paper, and include a receiver, a decoder to process the signal received by the decoder and a central processing unit, or CPU, that works preferably with a non-volatile memory as in various peripherals.

A non-volatile memory is a memory where the contents are maintained intact even if the main current supply is cut, for example through at least one independent source of energy such as batteries. Other types of non-volatile memories can be used, such as EEPROM, Flash EPROM or FEPRM. It is these non-volatile memories that keep the data safeguarded in case of an interruption in the supply of current, and it is essential to make the IRD processor work well.

The information is received by the IRD coming from the control center, in the form of a stream of data arriving at the receiver of the IRD unit. In the case of coded television, or more in general interactive, the stream of data includes video information, audio information, data information, execute applications and, finally, various types of data check information.

In this case it is a question of guaranteeing that the information is received in the correct way and interpreted by the IRD before being stored in the operational memory, particularly the execute data, that is, the software.

The receiver of the IRD transmits them to a decoder, that then puts them in circulation in the IRD by means of a bus. Connected to the bus there is a specialized multimedia processor that is, in turn, connected to a monitor and to one or more loudspeakers, the aforementioned non-volatile memory and one or more optional sub-devices. It is the IRD processor (CPU) that manages and controls its correct functioning, as well as the different sub-devices, such as an interface, an auxiliary memory pack, other processors or a modem. What is more, the control center may receive exchange information, for example through a modem connected to the public telecommunications network.

These sub-devices themselves could be the source of errors that it then acts upon to detect and correct, especially in the case of the loading of a new version of IRD operating software and particularly of its CPU, or of certain execute programs for the IRD or its components.

The software and the data for which the authenticity and integrity must be guaranteed may be loaded by various means. One of these means, as has already been said, consists in sending the aforementioned receiver an update of the memory with the stream of data, including a number of heading-like data blocks M1, M2, ...Mn to allow the data M1 to Mn to be easily recognizable for the central unit.

Alternatively, or as a supplement, the data blocks may reach the IRD through one of its optional sub-devices such as the modem, for example.

Within the sphere of the invention, the data blocks M1, M2, ...Mn may be sent in clear without any drawbacks, that is to say, without yet being ciphered.



The method according to the invention consists, in this form, of applying first of all, during the transmission stage, a mono-directional or Hash function to a part or to all of the data blocks M1, M2, ...Mn to obtain a representative Hx result of the M1 to Mn group. The data blocks M1 to Mn may be processed separately just the same and obtain the Hx1 result corresponding to M1, Hx2 corresponding to M2 and Hxn corresponding to Mn. This or these Hx results are memorised by the control center for ulterior verification.

A particularly crucial property for the authentication of the data, concerns the systems by which the data is transmitted along public routes such as Hertzian-wave, telephonic or internet routes. In this case, an intruder may take the place of the control center and send data to modify the operation of the target system.

Adding a cryptogram during the transmission of the data to authenticate the latter is well known. None the less, this cryptogram only responds to the need of identifying the author of the data but it has no effect on a decoder that has lost the reference criteria.

The strength of the method resides, in part, in the quality of the mono-directional H function and in the ratification of these signatures by a security unit that is reputed to be impenetrable. In this way, a simple checksum does not allow the exchange of two blocks of characters in the data to be detected because the addition is reputed to be, in mathematics, commutative and associative. On the other hand, a result of a Hash function Hx is a very realistic image of x, even if it is much longer than Hx. If an exchange of characters is carried out in the group of x characters, the H(x) function will detect it immediately, and the system will no longer be able to function following its detection. The result is a security crash.

An important aspect of the invention is that it allows a verification of the validity of the data in the peripheral unit's memory to be carried out at any time. As a matter of fact, the presence of this check information in the security module allows the decoder to carry out an auto-verification. This verification gives a result without comparing it to the checksum normally used in the program memory. If this verification gives a result similar to the reference, the unit has various means (modem connection, cable connection) to inform an external unit, for example the control center, about the non-conformity of the program.

If the preferential means of the invention for generating and transmitting check information is the control center, the invention has a peripheral unit in which all or a part of the program is initially loaded with the check information such as that described above. This can be carried out during fabrication at the moment of initialization before the sale through the processor, or by downloading the check information through one of the peripherals at the moment of an initialization step.

The invention is illustrated in the schematic block diagram of an IRD.

An IRD, or Integrated Receiver Decoder, is represented in this diagram, making up the peripheral part of the system to which the method according to the invention is applied, and in the way described below. This IRD includes a central bus DB to which all the different modules are connected. The central module of the IRD is made up of the CPU processor which has the task of carrying out the various processes.

An REC receiver receives a stream of data including video and audio information, data and execute applications through various support paths such as a cable, a Hertzian antenna, a satellite dish, internet or other known technology. This REC receiver is connected to a DC interface, which is also connected to the bus (DB).

The following are also connected to the bus (DB):

- A multimedia processor MP specialized in the processing of video or audio information, that sends it respectively to a monitor VD and loudspeakers AD;
- a test channel TC, which can be connected to a tester TEST for factory regulation and for maintenance;
- a non-volatile memory NVM, independent from the main power with its own feed source;
- an interface INT for a smart card, which physically receives the smart-card SC;
- an auxiliary memory or memory pack TMEM;
- a modem MD, connected to the public network NET, adopting widely known technology and supports;
- other processors OP, DP with various functions according to the needs of the user, in particular those used for data processing;

It is the CPU that controls the updating of the software, an example of which will be described. It accepts or rejects it according to the test results carried out using the method which is the object of this invention.

These software versions of the IRD's CPU may arrive at the IRD through the receiver REC, through the tester TEST, through the smart-card SC or through the network NET. In the following, an example of how a stream of video and audio information arrives at the IRD through the REC receiver will be described.

A set of data, representing a new software version arriving at the IRD, is stored in the temporary memory TMEM of the IRD, with the service information, after being controlled regarding its authenticity and its integrity. This allows the control center to load the software version into a large number of peripherals, and to carry out an error-free installation through the IRD.

Once the message has been received by the IRD, the data is broken up and the different elements are stored in the temporary memory TMEM. The IRD processes the blocks M1 to Mn in the same way as when they were transmitted, but in the opposite order. It is clear that in the case where the blocks are received in ciphered form, the first operation is to decipher the data with the public cipher-key PuK to have the data in clear.

The next step involves carrying out a mono-directional function H on the data blocks M1 to Mn to have a result of the values Hy1 to Hyn. In the case where an error has entered into the memory blocks M1, M2, ...Mn during the transmission of the message, this error will show up on Hy that will be found to be different from Hx which is contained in the control block and the data M1 to Mn will be rejected.

These results are transmitted to the smart-card SC that is in charge of their authentication. As described before, this operation is carried out through a connection to the control center, either immediately or at a later moment.

Examples of the H functions are the functions MD2, MD5 and SHA-1.

According to another embodiment of the invention, the unit containing the data does not have a communication path with a control center. The data is delivered to a storage unit with the control information (R1) including the result of a mono-directional or collision-free function, called Hash function, carried out on all or a part of the data (M1 to Mn). The particularity of this control data (R1) is that, on the one

hand, it contains the hash function for the set of data taken into consideration, while on the other hand that they are stored in a ciphered form  $k2(Hy)$ . The storage unit can neither understand nor can modify them.

During the verification phase, the storage unit transmits the check information to the security unit in a ciphered form. The security unit contains the means to decipher the information, particularly for extracting the result of the hash function ( $Hy$ ).

Moreover, according to a first embodiment, the storage unit carries out the hash function on the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$ , calculates the check information  $Hx$  and transmits it to the security unit for comparison. In exchange, the security unit sends the return data ( $R2$ ) to the storage unit, including the result of the comparison.

The storage unit is then in charge of taking the necessary measures in the case where the data is not authentic.

According to a second embodiment, the calculation of the check information  $Hx$  is carried out by the security unit, which in this case receives the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$  from the storage unit.

According to an embodiment giving a higher level of guarantee as far as the use of the data is concerned, a cipher key  $k3$  is added to the control data ( $R1$ ) to decipher the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$ .

This data is initially stored in a ciphered form and the Hash function is made in the ciphered data. When the integrity verification of the data is done for the security unit and the result is positive, the security unit, in the reply data ( $R2$ ) sent to the storage unit, includes the cipher-key  $k3$  which allows it to decipher the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$ .

According to a variation of the method described above, the security unit does not send the cipher-key  $k3$ , but it is the storage unit that sends the ciphered data  $M1$  to  $Mn$  to the security unit SC for deciphering.

In the same way as the previous method, this control may be carried out at any time during the operation of the storage unit.

The control data ( $R1$ ) includes a data describer  $D$  that indicates to the storage unit how to use the data. This describer can be in the form of a table containing the addresses and the destinations of the data. In this way, it will not be possible to use

the data without the descriptor, the latter being returned to the storage unit only if the comparison is positive.

It is also foreseen that a warrant is added to the control data (R1) which certifies the broadcaster of the data, in order to keep a trace of it in the security unit.

## CLAIMS

1. A method to check the integrity and the authenticity of a set of data received (M1 to Mn) by a pay-T.V. decoding unit, consisting of a decoder (IRD) and a security unit (SC), and also by a means of communication (NET, REC) with a control center, including the following steps;

- calculation of a check information ( $H_x$ ) which is representative of the result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data (M1 to Mn);

characterized in that, this method consisting of :

- transmitting the check information ( $H_x$ ) to the security unit (SC) and ciphering the check information ( $H_x$ ) with a first cipher-key ( $k_1$ );
  - sending the ciphered control information  $k_1(H_x)$  to the control center;
  - deciphering of the ciphered check information  $k_1(H_x)$  by the control center and comparing it with a reference value of the check information ( $H_y$ );
  - transmitting the control data (R) including the result of the comparison in a ciphered form to the security unit (SC);
  - deciphering of the ciphered result of the comparison by the security unit (SC) and informing the decoder (IRD) of the validity of the data (M1 to Mn).
2. A method according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the control center sends the reference value in a ciphered form  $k_2(H_y)$  with the control data (R) to the security module (SC).
3. A method according to claims 1 and 2, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the decoder (IRD), with the result being transmitted to the security unit (SC).
4. A method according to claims 1 to 3, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the security unit (SC), and the data (M1 to Mn) is transmitted from the decoder (IRD) to the security unit (SC).
5. A method according to claims 1 to 4, characterized by the fact that it consists of including a utilization describer (D) for the data (M1 to Mn) in the control data (R),

deciphering the control data (R) and transmitting the describer (D) to the decoder (IRD) if the result of the comparison is positive, processing the data (M1 to Mn) by the decoder (IRD) according to the guidelines contained in the describer (D).

6. A method according to claims 1 to 5, characterized by the fact that the data (M1 to Mn) is accompanied by validity information (CRC, CS, H) for the said data, and in which the security module (SC) transmits to the decoder the information to use or not this validity information to check the data (M1 to Mn).
7. A method according to claim 6, characterized by the fact that this validity information is of the type CRC (cyclic redundancy code), CS (checksum) or Hash (a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function).
8. A method according to claims 1 to 7, characterized by the fact that it includes a global check information (H'y) in the control data (R) which is representative of a result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the global data (M0 to Mm); this data is the same as, or includes, the data received (M1 to Mn).
9. A method according to claim 8, characterized by the fact that the control data (R) includes a warranty that certifies the broadcaster of the data (M1 to Mn).
10. A method according to claim 8, characterized by the fact that it consists of calculating periodically, or when requested, the value (H'x) representative of the result of a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the global data (M0 to Mm), with the security unit (SC) comparing the result (H'x) with the reference value (H'y).
11. A method according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the decoder (IRD), with the result of the calculation (H'x) being transmitted to the security unit (SC).
12. A method according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the security unit (SC), with the data (M0 to Mm) being transmitted from the decoder (IRD) to the security unit (SC).
13. A method according to claims 10 to 12, characterized by the fact that the periodic calculation is carried out on request from the control center, from the security unit, from a test unit (TEST) or from one of the means of communication (NET, REC).

14. A method according to claims 10 to 13, characterized by the fact that the result of the comparison is transmitted in a subscriber generated message common to the functioning of the system.
15. A method according to claims 10 to 13, characterized by the fact that the value calculated ( $H'x$ ) is transmitted to the control center inside subscriber generated messages common to the functioning of the system, with each message containing a part of the value calculated ( $H'x$ ).
16. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by the fact that the transmission to the control center is carried out in deferred mode, according to a timetable defined in a pseudo-random manner within predefined limits.
17. A method to check the integrity and the authenticity of a set of data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ) memorized inside a data storage unit connected with a security unit (SC) including the following steps:
  - transmission from the storage unit to the security unit (SC) of the control data ( $R1$ ) including ciphered reference check information  $k1(Hy)$  representative of the result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ );
  - calculation of check information ( $Hx$ ) which is representative of the result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ );
  - comparison of the calculated value ( $Hx$ ) with the deciphered reference value ( $Hy$ ) by the security unit (SC) and transfer of the management data ( $R2$ ) including the result of the comparison to the storage unit.
18. A method according to claim 17, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the storage unit, with the result of the calculation ( $Hx$ ) being transmitted to the security unit (SC).
19. A method according to claim 17, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the security unit (SC), with the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ) being transmitted from the storage unit to the security unit (SC).
20. A method according to claims 17 to 19, characterized by the fact that it includes, inside the control data ( $R1$ ), a utilization describer ( $D$ ) for the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ),



and if the result of the comparison is positive, sends the utilization describer (D) back to the storage unit in a deciphered form, to process the data (M1 to Mn) by the storage unit according to the guidelines contained in the describer (D).

21. A method according to claim 20, characterized by the fact that the control data (R1) includes a warrant that certifies the broadcaster of the data (M1 to Mn).
22. A method according to claims 17 to 21, characterized by the fact that it consists of calculating periodically, or when requested, the values (Hx) representative of the result of a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data (M1 to Mn), with the security unit (SC) comparing the result (Hx) with the reference value (Hy).
23. A method according to claims 17 to 22, characterized by the fact that it consists of:
  - storage of the data (M1 to Mn) in a ciphered form;
  - transmission to the security unit (SC) in the control data (R1) of a deciphering key (k3) for the data (M1 to Mn).
  - If the result of the comparison  $Hx=Hy$  is positive, deciphering of the data (M1 to Mn) with the use of the cipher-key (k3).
24. A method according to claim 23, characterized by the fact that the deciphering operation of the data (M1 to Mn) is carried out by the storage unit, the deciphering key (k3) being transmitted by the security unit (SC).
25. A method according to claim 23 characterized by the fact that the deciphering operation of the data (M1 to Mn) is carried out by the security unit (SC), the data (M1 to Mn) being transmitted from the storage unit to the security unit (SC).
26. A method according to claims 17 to 25 characterized by the fact that it includes, inside the control data (R1), a utilization describer (D) for the data (M1 to Mn), to decipher the control data (R1) and transmit the describer (D) to the storage unit if the result of the comparison is positive, to process the data (M1 to Mn) by the storage unit according to the guidelines contained in the describer (D).


# ABSTRACT

In order to guarantee the integrity and the authenticity of the data transmitted into a control center and one or more receiver units, each receiver unit includes a decoder (IRD) and a security unit (SC) and also a means of communication (NET, REC) with the control center.

The method consists of calculating a check information (Hx) representative of the result of a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data transmitted and to transmit the result to the control center for verification.

The center may inform the decoder on the authenticity of the data along the return paths or the main path.

(Figure 1)

**Fig. 1**

## A METHOD AND DEVICE TO GUARANTEE THE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF A SET OF DATA

This invention concerns the sector operating in the control of the integrity and authenticity of data, and in particular the downloading of software.

- 5 The invention is applied to all those apparatuses that contain at least one central unit such as those currently used in information technology, that is to say, with a processor that has at least a part of its program inside a rewrite memory.

It is well known that the alteration or the damage of data leaves traces in certain parts of the information processed and stored in a memory, either before or after  
10 being processed. It is also known that a simple mathematical technique such as "checksum" is used in order to determine if the data taken into consideration has been modified by establishing a checksum reference.

However, it is possible that the control system has also been altered and that it is no longer able to verify the contents of its memory. Thus, during the course of  
15 mathematical operations, the propagation of compensatory random errors may occur, giving an identical result to the one expected. Consequently, verification by the known methods will be inoperative in certain cases.

There is, therefore, a problem that is not solved in a satisfactory manner, which consists in improving the reliability and the security achieved by the known  
20 verification methods, particularly when the same unit is in charge of calculating its own checksum and of comparing it with a reference value.

It is well known that, in order to render all data modifications visible, a mono-directional operation is used on the data, that is, an operation that is easy to perform in one direction but almost impossible to perform in the other direction. For  
25 example, the operation  $X^Y$  is easy to carry out, while the operation  $Y\sqrt{X}$  is much more difficult.

The term collision-free operation means an operation according to which any different combination of data that is entered gives a similar result.

Within the sphere of this invention, this mono-directional operation is a  
30 mathematical application H of a source group towards an object group, in which each x element of the source group is attributed with an  $H(x)$  symbol. These

functions are particularly useful when there are functions known as Hash, as they are defined on page 27 of the RSA Laboratories publication "Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography, v.4.0". The  $x$  element can be of any length, but  $H(x)$  always has a series of characters of a fixed length (fixed-size string). Such a function is difficult to invert, that is to say, knowing  $H(x)$  does not generally mean that  $x$  can be found. It is said to be more collision-free when it is injective, that is, that  $H(y) = H(x)$  leads to  $y = x$ , or  $H(y) \neq H(x)$  leads to  $y \neq x$ .

The aim of this invention is to guarantee that the information contained in a pay-T.V. decoder is, on the one hand, that which the control center has transmitted and, on the other hand, has not been altered.

The aim is achieved through the use of a method to check the integrity and authenticity of a set of memorized data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ) in a pay-T.V. decoding unit, consisting of a decoding unit and a security unit, along with a means of communication (NET, REC) with a control center.

This method consists in:

- transmitting the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ) to the security unit;
- calculating a check information ( $Hx$ ) representative of the result of a function called mono-directional and collision-free, carried out on all or only a part of the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ );
- ciphering the check information ( $Hx$ ) with a first cipher-key ( $k1$ );
- establishing the conformity of the check information ( $Hx$ ) by way of a communication to the control center by one of the means of communication.

In this way, the integrity of the data is no longer checked exclusively by the decoding unit in which the data is stored, but is guaranteed by an external unit, considered impenetrable, the security unit.

According to this invention, the decoder itself can carry out the calculations and transmit the results to the security unit, or transmit the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$  to the security unit which will then carry out the calculation of the Hash information.

The cipher-keys used to cipher the information with the control center are contained exclusively in the security unit. The decoder does not have the means to decipher

these messages and so modify the data transmitted by the control center when the same messages pass through the decoder.

These security units are generally in the form of smart-cards, and include a memory, a microprocessor and a means of communication.

- 5 By means of communication we mean either a two-directional connection by a cable, a modem outlet or a Hertzian-wave connection. The principle means of carrying the data and on which messages directed to the security module are forwarded is included in this term.

10 The verification operation of the conformity of the check information (Hx) may be carried out in various ways.

The security module sends the ciphered check information to the control center, the latter being in charge of carrying out the verification. In the reply, the control center may send either a simple result of the comparison OK/NOK, or send the reference value. All these messages are ciphered by a cipher-key of the security module.

- 15 The control center memorizes the result with reference to each subscriber unit as proof of the correct functioning of the downloading operation or, contrarily, of the alteration of the data in view of a repetition, for example.

20 According to a variation of the invention, the control center may first send the reference value directly to the security units. In this way, it will not be necessary to ask the control center to verify the conformity of the calculated check information, Hx.

25 With another operational method, and when a verification request comes from a security unit, the control center sends, as a comparison result, the reference value (Hy) in a ciphered form  $k_2(Hy)$  to the security unit. Once this is done, the control center does not only inform the security unit whether it is correct or not, but sends the reference value to the security unit. It will be done mainly if the comparison has given a positive result so that the security unit can memorize the reference value Hy.

30 The sending of this information can be carried out by an auxiliary means of communication such as a modem, or by the main data path.

In the case where the data M1 to Mn is already accompanied by a means of verification, such as CRC, Checksum or Hash, the decoding unit may carry out an initial test with the means contained inside it. None the less, the reliability of this test is to create a doubt, that is, if the data has been modified by a third person, it is certain that that person will have modified the verification means in the same way. This is because, with this method of the invention, the security unit can inform the decoding unit not to accept the test result as a guarantee of the authenticity of the data, but that the authenticity is determined according to the method described further on.

This variation is important in the case of the updating of a number of decoders, some of which of an old generation operating system type and in need of a Checksum verification, or others that have already been equipped for the system according to the method claimed herein.

When updated software is downloaded, it is quite common to send only the part that has been modified. The data M1 to Mn does not represent the whole newly-updated program. This is because, in order to maintain a reliable means of verifying the whole program, it is important to have an H'y reference value available that is representative of a Hash function in the newly created program.

There is a first method which consists in establishing the initial integrity of a program P0, that is, before being updated. To do this, the initial results H0 of the Hash function in the program P0 are either initialized on installing the program or established according to the method in this invention.

When the authenticity of the data of the update has been established and have been introduced into the memory program, the security unit can immediately order a Hash function to be carried out on the whole of the new program P1 giving the result H1. This result will be needed for the following checks or for further updates.

A variation of this method consists in obtaining the new H'y value which is representative of the result of the Hash function on the whole new program P1 from the control center, represented here by M0 to Mm.

The control data R sent by the control center may include a utilization data describer D that indicates to the decoding unit (IRD) how to use this data. The describer may be in the form of a table that contains all the addresses and

destinations of the data. In this way, it will not be possible to use this data without the descriptor, the latter being sent back to the decoding unit (IRD) only if the comparison is positive.

According to a variation of the invention, the control center includes a warranty to certify the broadcaster of the data with the control data R.

This verification function is connected not only to the downloading of new data in a decoder, but also allows the testing of the validity and authenticity of the data at any moment. In this case, the operation consists of periodically calculating, or according to a request, the representative Hx values of the result of a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function carried out on all or only a part of the data (M0 to Mm) in the operational memory of the decoder, and to transmit this information (H'x) to the security unit for comparison with a reference value (H'y).

To carry out this operation, there is a first method which consists in the calculation being carried out by the decoder, the result being transmitted to the security unit.

According to a variation of this method, the calculation is carried out by the security unit, with the data (M0 to Mm) being transmitted from the decoder to the security unit (SC).

The request for these verification operations may come from the control center, from the security unit, from a test unit or from one of the means of communication, even if they are under tension.

While the security unit compares the calculated H'x value with the reference value H'y, the latter may be represented either by the value calculated by the IRD decoder after the confirmation of its validity from the control center, or by the reference value supplied by the control center.

One of the ways in which certain dishonest people use to try and understand how a pay-T.V. system works, is to observe the reaction following an attempt at modifying it. This is why the invention is equally open to a way of transmitting the result of the comparison carried out with another method, for example when the subscriber decides to accept an event, and a subscriber generated message is sent to the control center.

It is useful to include the information that the data M1 to Mn has been changed in the message, otherwise it would be extremely difficult to make the tie between the



modification of the data and the blockage of the decoder, that could happen much later.

According to a variation, the value of the result of the calculation Hx is transmitted to the control center. To do this, and to remain hidden, the result is divided up and included piece by piece inside administration messages used by the system.

The control center recomposes the Hx value piece by piece and when the value is complete, determines if there are modifications to the values.

One problem that is encountered when updating a large number of decoders is with the number of requests to the control center to obtain the verification.

One proposed solution in the sphere of this invention is to sub-divide the requests to the control center for a verification in a pseudo-random way.

Another solution previously described consists in sending a preliminary reference value. In this way, if the data is received correctly, which is in the majority of cases, the update can take effect without waiting for a request at the control center. This request will be carried out anyway to confirm that the update has been carried out correctly.

In a particular way of operating, the group considered includes a transmitter part, located inside a control center, and a receiver that can be made up of quite a large number of peripheral units which work in a similar way. The aim is to guarantee that the software sent by the transmission part is received in an authentic and complete way by each of the peripheral units. In line with the terminology used in pay television, which represents an important but not exclusive application of the invention, the peripheral units will be called IRD (Integrated Receiver Decoder) in the following part of the paper, and include a receiver, a decoder to process the signal received by the decoder and a central processing unit, or CPU, that works preferably with a non-volatile memory as in various peripherals.

A non-volatile memory is a memory where the contents are maintained intact even if the main current supply is cut, for example through at least one independent source of energy such as batteries. Other types of non-volatile memories can be used, such as EEPROM, Flash EPROM or FEPROM. It is these non-volatile memories that keep the data safeguarded in case of an interruption in the supply of current, and it is essential to make the IRD processor work well.

The information is received by the IRD coming from the control center, in the form of a stream of data arriving at the receiver of the IRD unit. In the case of coded television, or more in general interactive, the stream of data includes video information, audio information, data information, execute applications and, finally, various types of data check information.

In this case it is a question of guaranteeing that the information is received in the correct way and interpreted by the IRD before being stored in the operational memory, particularly the execute data, that is, the software.

The receiver of the IRD transmits them to a decoder, that then puts them in circulation in the IRD by means of a bus. Connected to the bus there is a specialized multimedia processor that is, in turn, connected to a monitor and to one or more loudspeakers, the aforementioned non-volatile memory and one or more optional sub-devices. It is the IRD processor (CPU) that manages and controls its correct functioning, as well as the different sub-devices, such as an interface, an auxiliary memory pack, other processors or a modem. What is more, the control center may receive exchange information, for example through a modem connected to the public telecommunications network.

These sub-devices themselves could be the source of errors that it then acts upon to detect and correct, especially in the case of the loading of a new version of IRD operating software and particularly of its CPU, or of certain execute programs for the IRD or its components.

The software and the data for which the authenticity and integrity must be guaranteed may be loaded by various means. One of these means, as has already been said, consists in sending the aforementioned receiver an update of the memory with the stream of data, including a number of heading-like data blocks M1, M2, ...Mn to allow the data M1 to Mn to be easily recognizable for the central unit.

Alternatively, or as a supplement, the data blocks may reach the IRD through one of its optional sub-devices such as the modem, for example.

Within the sphere of the invention, the data blocks M1, M2, ...Mn may be sent in clear without any drawbacks, that is to say, without yet being ciphered.

The method according to the invention consists, in this form, of applying first of all, during the transmission stage, a mono-directional or Hash function to a part or to all of the data blocks M1, M2, ...Mn to obtain a representative Hx result of the M1 to Mn group. The data blocks M1 to Mn may be processed separately just the same and obtain the Hx1 result corresponding to M1, Hx2 corresponding to M2 and Hxn corresponding to Mn. This or these Hx results are memorised by the control center for ulterior verification.

A particularly crucial property for the authentication of the data, concerns the systems by which the data is transmitted along public routes such as Hertzian-wave, telephonic or internet routes. In this case, an intruder may take the place of the control center and send data to modify the operation of the target system.

Adding a cryptogram during the transmission of the data to authenticate the latter is well known. None the less, this cryptogram only responds to the need of identifying the author of the data but it has no effect on a decoder that has lost the reference criteria.

The strength of the method resides, in part, in the quality of the mono-directional H function and in the ratification of these signatures by a security unit that is reputed to be impenetrable. In this way, a simple checksum does not allow the exchange of two blocks of characters in the data to be detected because the addition is reputed to be, in mathematics, commutative and associative. On the other hand, a result of a Hash function Hx is a very realistic image of x, even if it is much longer than Hx. If an exchange of characters is carried out in the group of x characters, the H(x) function will detect it immediately, and the system will no longer be able to function following its detection. The result is a security crash.

An important aspect of the invention is that it allows a verification of the validity of the data in the peripheral unit's memory to be carried out at any time. As a matter of fact, the presence of this check information in the security module allows the decoder to carry out an auto-verification. This verification gives a result without comparing it to the checksum normally used in the program memory. If this verification gives a result similar to the reference, the unit has various means (modem connection, cable connection) to inform an external unit, for example the control center, about the non-conformity of the program.

If the preferential means of the invention for generating and transmitting check information is the control center, the invention has a peripheral unit in which all or a part of the program is initially loaded with the check information such as that described above. This can be carried out during fabrication at the moment of initialization before the sale through the processor, or by downloading the check information through one of the peripherals at the moment of an initialization step.

The invention is illustrated in the schematic block diagram of an IRD.

An IRD, or Integrated Receiver Decoder, is represented in this diagram, making up the peripheral part of the system to which the method according to the invention is applied, and in the way described below. This IRD includes a central bus DB to which all the different modules are connected. The central module of the IRD is made up of the CPU processor which has the task of carrying out the various processes.

An REC receiver receives a stream of data including video and audio information, data and execute applications through various support paths such as a cable, a Hertzian antenna, a satellite dish, internet or other known technology. This REC receiver is connected to a DC interface, which is also connected to the bus (DB).

The following are also connected to the bus (DB):

- A multimedia processor MP specialized in the processing of video or audio information, that sends it respectively to a monitor VD and loudspeakers AD;
- a test channel TC, which can be connected to a tester TEST for factory regulation and for maintenance;
- a non-volatile memory NVM, independent from the main power with its own feed source;
- an interface INT for a smart card, which physically receives the smart-card SC;
- an auxiliary memory or memory pack TMEM;
- a modem MD, connected to the public network NET, adopting widely known technology and supports;
- other processors OP, DP with various functions according to the needs of the user, in particular those used for data processing;

It is the CPU that controls the updating of the software, an example of which will be described. It accepts or rejects it according to the test results carried out using the method which is the object of this invention.

These software versions of the IRD's CPU may arrive at the IRD through the receiver REC, through the tester TEST, through the smart-card SC or through the network NET. In the following, an example of how a stream of video and audio information arrives at the IRD through the REC receiver will be described.

A set of data, representing a new software version arriving at the IRD, is stored in the temporary memory TMEM of the IRD, with the service information, after being controlled regarding its authenticity and its integrity. This allows the control center to load the software version into a large number of peripherals, and to carry out an error-free installation through the IRD.

Once the message has been received by the IRD, the data is broken up and the different elements are stored in the temporary memory TMEM. The IRD processes the blocks M1 to Mn in the same way as when they were transmitted, but in the opposite order. It is clear that in the case where the blocks are received in ciphered form, the first operation is to decipher the data with the public cipher-key PuK to have the data in clear.

The next step involves carrying out a mono-directional function H on the data blocks M1 to Mn to have a result of the values Hy1 to Hyn. In the case where an error has entered into the memory blocks M1, M2, ...Mn during the transmission of the message, this error will show up on Hy that will be found to be different from Hx which is contained in the control block and the data M1 to Mn will be rejected.

These results are transmitted to the smart-card SC that is in charge of their authentication. As described before, this operation is carried out through a connection to the control center, either immediately or at a later moment.

Examples of the H functions are the functions MD2, MD5 and SHA-1.

According to another embodiment of the invention, the unit containing the data does not have a communication path with a control center. The data is delivered to a storage unit with the control information (R1) including the result of a mono-directional or collision-free function, called Hash function, carried out on all or a part of the data (M1 to Mn). The particularity of this control data (R1) is that, on the one

hand, it contains the hash function for the set of data taken into consideration, while on the other hand that they are stored in a ciphered form  $k2(Hy)$ . The storage unit can neither understand nor can modify them.

During the verification phase, the storage unit transmits the check information to the security unit in a ciphered form. The security unit contains the means to decipher the information, particularly for extracting the result of the hash function ( $Hy$ ).

Moreover, according to a first embodiment, the storage unit carries out the hash function on the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$ , calculates the check information  $Hx$  and transmits it to the security unit for comparison. In exchange, the security unit sends the return data ( $R2$ ) to the storage unit, including the result of the comparison.

The storage unit is then in charge of taking the necessary measures in the case where the data is not authentic.

According to a second embodiment, the calculation of the check information  $Hx$  is carried out by the security unit, which in this case receives the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$  from the storage unit.

According to an embodiment giving a higher level of guarantee as far as the use of the data is concerned, a cipher key  $k3$  is added to the control data ( $R1$ ) to decipher the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$ .

This data is initially stored in a ciphered form and the Hash function is made in the ciphered data. When the integrity verification of the data is done for the security unit and the result is positive, the security unit, in the reply data ( $R2$ ) sent to the storage unit, includes the cipher-key  $k3$  which allows it to decipher the data  $M1$  to  $Mn$ .

According to a variation of the method described above, the security unit does not send the cipher-key  $k3$ , but it is the storage unit that sends the ciphered data  $M1$  to  $Mn$  to the security unit SC for deciphering.

In the same way as the previous method, this control may be carried out at any time during the operation of the storage unit.

The control data ( $R1$ ) includes a data describer  $D$  that indicates to the storage unit how to use the data. This describer can be in the form of a table containing the addresses and the destinations of the data. In this way, it will not be possible to use

the data without the descriptor, the latter being returned to the storage unit only if the comparison is positive.

It is also foreseen that a warrant is added to the control data (R1) which certifies the broadcaster of the data, in order to keep a trace of it in the security unit.

## CLAIMS

1. A method to check the integrity and the authenticity of a set of data received (M1 to Mn) by a pay-T.V. decoding unit, consisting of a decoder (IRD) and a security unit (SC), and also by a means of communication (NET, REC) with a control center, including the following steps;

- calculation of a check information ( $H_x$ ) which is representative of the result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data (M1 to Mn);

characterized in that, this method consisting of :

- transmitting the check information ( $H_x$ ) to the security unit (SC) and ciphering the check information ( $H_x$ ) with a first cipher-key ( $k_1$ );
- sending the ciphered control information  $k_1(H_x)$  to the control center;
- deciphering of the ciphered check information  $k_1(H_x)$  by the control center and comparing it with a reference value of the check information ( $H_y$ );
- transmitting the control data (R) including the result of the comparison in a ciphered form to the security unit (SC);
- deciphering of the ciphered result of the comparison by the security unit (SC) and informing the decoder (IRD) of the validity of the data (M1 to Mn).

2. A method according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the control center sends the reference value in a ciphered form  $k_2(H_y)$  with the control data (R) to the security module (SC).

3. A method according to claims 1 and 2, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the decoder (IRD), with the result being transmitted to the security unit (SC).

4. A method according to claims 1 to 3, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the security unit (SC), and the data (M1 to Mn) is transmitted from the decoder (IRD) to the security unit (SC).

5. A method according to claims 1 to 4, characterized by the fact that it consists of including a utilization describer (D) for the data (M1 to Mn) in the control data (R),



deciphering the control data (R) and transmitting the describer (D) to the decoder (IRD) if the result of the comparison is positive, processing the data (M1 to Mn) by the decoder (IRD) according to the guidelines contained in the describer (D).

6. A method according to claims 1 to 5, characterized by the fact that the data (M1 to Mn) is accompanied by validity information (CRC, CS, H) for the said data, and in which the security module (SC) transmits to the decoder the information to use or not this validity information to check the data (M1 to Mn).
7. A method according to claim 6, characterized by the fact that this validity information is of the type CRC (cyclic redundancy code), CS (checksum) or Hash (a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function).
8. A method according to claims 1 to 7, characterized by the fact that it includes a global check information (H'y) in the control data (R) which is representative of a result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the global data (M0 to Mm); this data is the same as, or includes, the data received (M1 to Mn).
9. A method according to claim 8, characterized by the fact that the control data (R) includes a warranty that certifies the broadcaster of the data (M1 to Mn).
10. A method according to claim 8, characterized by the fact that it consists of calculating periodically, or when requested, the value (H'x) representative of the result of a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the global data (M0 to Mm), with the security unit (SC) comparing the result (H'x) with the reference value (H'y).
11. A method according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the decoder (IRD), with the result of the calculation (H'x) being transmitted to the security unit (SC).
12. A method according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the security unit (SC), with the data (M0 to Mm) being transmitted from the decoder (IRD) to the security unit (SC).
13. A method according to claims 10 to 12, characterized by the fact that the periodic calculation is carried out on request from the control center, from the security unit, from a test unit (TEST) or from one of the means of communication (NET, REC).

14. A method according to claims 10 to 13, characterized by the fact that the result of the comparison is transmitted in a subscriber generated message common to the functioning of the system.
15. A method according to claims 10 to 13, characterized by the fact that the value calculated ( $H_x$ ) is transmitted to the control center inside subscriber generated messages common to the functioning of the system, with each message containing a part of the value calculated ( $H_x$ ).
16. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by the fact that the transmission to the control center is carried out in deferred mode, according to a timetable defined in a pseudo-random manner within predefined limits.
17. A method to check the integrity and the authenticity of a set of data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ) memorized inside a data storage unit connected with a security unit (SC) including the following steps:
- transmission from the storage unit to the security unit (SC) of the control data ( $R1$ ) including ciphered reference check information  $k1(H_y)$  representative of the result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ );
  - calculation of check information ( $H_x$ ) which is representative of the result of a mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ );
  - comparison of the calculated value ( $H_x$ ) with the deciphered reference value ( $H_y$ ) by the security unit (SC) and transfer of the management data ( $R2$ ) including the result of the comparison to the storage unit.
18. A method according to claim 17, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the storage unit, with the result of the calculation ( $H_x$ ) being transmitted to the security unit (SC).
19. A method according to claim 17, characterized by the fact that the calculation is carried out by the security unit (SC), with the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ) being transmitted from the storage unit to the security unit (SC).
20. A method according to claims 17 to 19, characterized by the fact that it includes, inside the control data ( $R1$ ), a utilization describer ( $D$ ) for the data ( $M1$  to  $Mn$ ),

and if the result of the comparison is positive, sends the utilization describer (D) back to the storage unit in a deciphered form, to process the data (M1 to Mn) by the storage unit according to the guidelines contained in the describer (D).

21. A method according to claim 20, characterized by the fact that the control data (R1) includes a warrant that certifies the broadcaster of the data (M1 to Mn).

22. A method according to claims 17 to 21, characterized by the fact that it consists of calculating periodically, or when requested, the values (Hx) representative of the result of a so-called mono-directional and collision-free function, carried out on all or only a part of the data (M1 to Mn), with the security unit (SC) comparing the result (Hx) with the reference value (Hy).


23. A method according to claims 17 to 22, characterized by the fact that it consists of:

- storage of the data (M1 to Mn) in a ciphered form;
- transmission to the security unit (SC) in the control data (R1) of a deciphering key (k3) for the data (M1 to Mn).
- If the result of the comparison  $Hx=Hy$  is positive, deciphering of the data (M1 to Mn) with the use of the cipher-key (k3).

24. A method according to claim 23, characterized by the fact that the deciphering operation of the data (M1 to Mn) is carried out by the storage unit, the deciphering key (k3) being transmitted by the security unit (SC).

25. A method according to claim 23 characterized by the fact that the deciphering operation of the data (M1 to Mn) is carried out by the security unit (SC), the data (M1 to Mn) being transmitted from the storage unit to the security unit (SC).

26. A method according to claims 17 to 25 characterized by the fact that it includes, inside the control data (R1), a utilization describer (D) for the data (M1 to Mn), to decipher the control data (R1) and transmit the describer (D) to the storage unit if the result of the comparison is positive, to process the data (M1 to Mn) by the storage unit according to the guidelines contained in the describer (D).

**Fig. 1**

# DECLARATION AND POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PATENT APPLICATION

Docket No. 16674-8

As a below named inventor, I hereby declare that:

My residence, post office address and citizenship are as stated below next to my name.

I believe I am the original, first and sole inventor (if only one name is listed below) or an original, first and joint inventor (if plural names are listed below) of the subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is sought on the invention entitled

## IMPULSE PURCHASE SYSTEM FOR PAY-TELEVISION

the specification of which

- (check one) ☒ is attached hereto.  
☐ was filed on \_\_\_\_\_ as Application Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 and was amended on \_\_\_\_\_ (if applicable).  
☐ was filed as PCT International Application No. PCT/IB00/00847 and  
 was amended under PCT Article 19 on \_\_\_\_\_ (if applicable).

I hereby state that I have reviewed and understand the contents of the above-identified specification, including the claims, as amended by any amendment referred to above.

I acknowledge the duty to disclose information which is material to the patentability of this application in accordance with Title 37, Code of Federal Regulations, §1.56.

I hereby claim foreign priority benefits under Title 35, United States Code, §119 of any foreign application(s) for patent or inventor's certificate or any PCT international application(s) designating at least one country other than the United States of America listed below and have also identified below any foreign application(s) for patent or inventor's certificate or any PCT international application(s) designating at least one country other than the United States of America filed by me on the same subject matter having a filing date before that of the application(s) on which priority is claimed:

Prior Foreign/PCT Application(s)

Priority Claimed

1438/99  
(Application No.)

CH  
(Country/PCT)

4 August 1999  
(Day /Month/Year Filed)

☒ ☐  
Yes No

I hereby claim the benefit under Title 35, United States code, §120 of any United States application(s) or PCT international application(s) designating the United States of America that is/are listed below and, insofar as the subject matter of each of the claims of this application is not disclosed in that/those prior application(s) in the manner provided by the first paragraph of Title 35, United States Code, §112, I acknowledge the duty to disclose material information as defined in Title 37, Code of Federal Regulations, §1.56 which occurred between the filing date of the prior application(s) and the national or PCT international filing date of this application:

Prior U.S./PCT Applications:

(U.S. Application Serial No.) (U.S. Filing Date) (Status-patented/pending/abandoned)

(PCT Application No.) (U.S. Filing Date) (U.S. Serial No. Assigned, if any) (Status-patented/pending/abandoned)

I hereby declare that all statement made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code and that such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issued thereon.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: As a named inventor, I hereby appoint the following attorney(s) and/or agent(s) to prosecute this application and to transact all business in the Patent and Trademark Office connected therewith: Harold R. Woodard, No. 16214; C. David Emhardt, No. 18,483; Joseph A. Naughton Jr., No. 19,814; John V. Moriarty, No. 26,207; John C. McNett, No. 25,533; Thomas Q. Henry, No. 28,309; James M. Durlacher, No. 28,840; Charles R. Reeves, No. 28,750; Vincent O. Wagner, No. 29,596; Steve Zlatos, No. 30,123; Spiro Bereveskos, No. 30,821; William F. Bahret, No. 31,087; Clifford W. Browning, No. 32,201; R. Randall Frisk, No. 32,221; Daniel J. Lueders, No. 32,581; Michael D. Beck, No. 32,722; and Kenneth A. Gandy, No. 33,386.

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